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Abilities and Knowledge in
Education al Achievement
Testing: The Assessment of
Dynamic Cognitive
Structu res 1

Samue l Messick
Educational Testing Service

T his chapter confronts the question of what role cogniti ve abilities play or ought
to play in educational achievement testing, which raises the prior question of
what educational achievement tests are or ought to be . I begin by considering the
nature of educational achievement as a construct in an attempt to circumscribe
what achievement tests ought to be rather than by examining extant achi evement
tests that may be variously o ff target. S imilar consideration is accorded cognitive
ability as a construct. This distinction between constructs and the imperfect,
variously contaminated tests that are purported to measure them is a critical
recurrent theme in these de liberations . Other questions to be briefl y addressed
concern the role of cogniti ve abilities in the processes of schoo l learning and the
role of schooling in the development of cognitive abilities.

STRUCTUR ES OF KNOWLEDGE AND ABILI TY
Educational ac hievement refers to what an indi vidual kn ows and can do in a
spec ified subject area . At issue is not mere ly the amount of knowledge acc umulated but its organizatio n or structure as a functional system for productive

IT hi s chapter was presented as part of a Division 15 (Educati onal Psychology) invited symposiu m on Achievement Testing at the annual meeting of the America n Psychologica l Assoc iation,
Washingto n , D.C. , August 1982 .
T his chapter is dedicated to the memory of Robert L. Ebe l. Hi s endu ring commitment to the
improvement of educational measurement as a means of improv ing education is a worthy legacy fo r
the fie ld.
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thinking , problem so lving , and creative invention in the subject area as well as
fo r further learning. T he individual 's structure of knowledge is a critical aspect
of educational achievement because it facilit ates or hinders what he or she can do
in the subject area . What a person can do in an area includes a variety of areaspecific skills, such as extracting a square root or parsing a sentence or balancing
a chemical eq uation , but also broader cognitive abilities that cut across subject
areas, such as comprehension , memory retention and retrieval, reasoning, analysis and restructuring, evaluation or judgment , and flu ency.
T hese broader cognitive ab ilities contribute to the assembly and structuring of
knowledge , to the continual reassembly and restructuring of cumulating knowl edge, to the accessing and retrieval of know ledge, and to its use in problem
representation and solution . "Thus achievement," in Snow's (1980a) words,
" is as much an organization function as it is an acquisition function. And new
achievement depends as much on transfer of such organization as it does on
transfer of specific prior facts and skill s [p o 43 ]. " Because cognitive abilities
pl aya central role in both the acqui sition and organi zation functions of educational achievement, their influence can hardly be suppressed or ignored in educational achievement testing that assesses knowledge structures. However , their
role may be reduced in low-level achievement testing that stresses amount of
in fo rmation alone. Let us next consider the nature of developed knowledge
structures in more detail and then the nature of deve loped abilities , before attempting to relate thi s formu lation to other conceptions of educational
achievement.

Knowledge Structure as Relational Understanding
A person's structure of knowl edge in a subject area includes not only declarative
knowledge about substance (or information about what) but also procedural
knowledge about methods (or information about how) and strategic knowledge
about alternatives for goal setting and planning (or information about which,
when , and possibly why). Although the acquisition of declarative and procedural
knowledge is an explic it goal of typical instruction in most subject areas, strategic knowledge is rarely so and must often be acquired by induction , if at all
(Greeno, 1980). Despite enormou s variability in the effort , the principles and
generali zations and first-order relations among concepts that provide coherent
though rudimentary structure to newly acquired knowledge are also often taught
explicitly . Possible exceptions are likely to occur at the beginning or elementary
levels of learn ing in a field , where emph asis may be placed on the accumulation
of a critica l mass of information prior to organi zing it. But the more idiosy ncratic
structures that relate newly acquired knowledge to ex istent knowledge structures
(which sometimes entail s qualitative reorgani zations) and the more complex
structures that evolve as experti se develops (which frequently entail s qualitative
reorganizations) are rare ly under instructional control.
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Knowledge structure basically refers to the structure of re lationships among
concepts. But as knowledge develops, these structures quickly go beyond classifications of concepts as well as first-order relations among concepts and classes
to include organized systems of relationships , or schemas. As organizations of
present knowledge, these schemas provide a context for the comprehension and
interpretation of objects and events; hence, they profoundly influence the acquisition of new knowledge. Schemas guide the storage and retrieval of knowledge, the generalization and interpretation of ideas, and the initiation and regulation of action (Anderson, Spiro, & Montague, 1977) . Thus, educational
achievement is not just data driven by the bottom- up processing of incom ing
information but also conceptually driven by top- down assimilation to mental
schemas or relational structures. Furthermore, as expertise develops , these schemas or relational systems themselves become organized in complex patterns ,
hierarchies, and dynamic networks. These networks are called dynam ic because
the knowledge structures of experts permit and even facilitate flexibl e reorganizations for the application of multiple perspectives to problem representation
and solution . I have more to discuss later about the implicatio ns for educational
achievement testing of the differences between novices and experts and between
beginning learners and experienced learners in a field .
In the context of school learning, the development of students' knowledge
structures may be viewed as an explicit educational objective in its own right. In
this connection, Scriven (1974) points out that knowledge structures comprise
"organized relational knowledge," which is what we ordinarily mean by understanding, and that implicit in the use of this latter term are a number of affective
educational goals bearing on the development of attitudes, values , sensitivity,
and appreciation. As Scriven (1 974) put it , "there are deep reasons from cogni tive psychology why understanding almost has to have an affective component,
reasons which emerge in the verstehen theory of the philosophy of history, in the
notion of empathy, and in concepts of modelling and role playing [p o 334]."
Furthermore, affect and personality are intrinsically implicated in knowledge
structure as a conseq uence of the individual's psychology of knowledge
(Tomkins, 1965); that is, what people know and are interested in knowing is a
function of the kinds of persons they are and especially of their ideologies .
Moreover, the degree of differentiation and hierarchic integration of the knowledge structure, the permeability of its boundaries, and the flexibility or rigidity of
its dimensions or compartments are reflective of the individual's personality and
cognitive style (Messick, 1976, in press).
This view of educational achievement stresses the assessment of developed
knowledge structure because it is both a product of earlier learning and at the
same time is instrumental to, or a vehicle for , subseq uent learning. Thus, know ledge structure is central whether the aim of achievement testing is the certification of past accomplishment, the diagnosis of present functioning, or the forecasting of future attainment. By emphas izing the role of knowledge structure as
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the representation each learner constructs of a subject area to comprehend tasks
and events, make sense of new experiences, and plan appropriate actions, this
view is inherently constructivist in character. It is consistent with a variety of
constructivi st psychologies but does not derive from anyone of them . For example , this view of learn ing and achievement is closely allied to what Bruner has
called " instrumental conceptualism" (Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1966). It is
also quite congenial with Piaget's overall stance on developmental process without comm itting to his position on developmental stages; that is, learn ing and the
development of cognitive structure are seen as the active assimilation of experience to conceptual schemas , in balance with the restructuring of schemas in
accommodation to reality-based or theoretically-correct structures.

Cognitive Abilities as Process Structures
T urning now to cognitive ability as a construct, let me stress at the outset that I
am speaking of multiple abilities and not a unitary force or power , about developed abilities and not fixed abi lities or capacities (Humphreys , 1962). Indeed,
these abi lities are clearly sti ll developing well into ad ulthood (Cattell , 1971).
They may develop more slowly later in learning than earlier and more rapidly for
some individuals than others . Some may decline with advancing age, sometimes
being compensated for by increasing facility in the utilization of other abilities.
But, in general , cognitive abilities appear to respond over the long term to
education and experience throughout the school years and beyond-even such
broad intellective abilities as verbal comprehension and quantitative reasoning
that are relatively well crystall ized by adolescence (Cattell, 1971 ; Messick ,
1980, 1982b).
Nor is there any implication of innateness of these cognitive ab ilities inherent
either in the way they are measured or in the way they are theoretically conceptualized. At the level of measurement, the drawing of inferences about innate
abi lity from an individual's test performance has long been discredited. Such
in ferences drawn by early intelligence testers were based on two unsupportable
assumptions abo ut equality of motivation to learn and equality of opportunity to
learn. These early testers reasoned that by selecting skills that all individuals are
expected to develop as a matter of course in their cu lture, gross differences in
motivation to learn were avoided ; selecting ski ll s that can be mastered on the
basi s of universally available experiences within the culture avoided gross differences in opportunity to learn. Hence, performance differences on tests of
those skills, they would have it , reflect individual differences in innate ability to
learn.
The crucial flaw in this reasoning lies in the premises- ski lls that all examinees have equal motivation and opportunity to acqui re probably do not exist
(Schwarz , 1971). Efforts to satisfy these ass umptions continue, however, in the
gui se of so-called "culture-free" or "culture-fair" tests . Here, the usual ap-
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proach is to select novel tasks where the opportunity (or rather, the lack of
opportunity) for mastering them is more nearly equivalent in different cultural
settings. This may better satisfy the opportunity assumption but at the expense of
the motivation assumption, because tasks that are not emphasized in a culture
depend for their salience or stimulus value on their intrinsic interest and the
presumed importance of the testing to each examinee.
In contrast, the concept of developed abilities stresses the individual's current
level of consistent proficiency however derived. Individual differences in developed abilities frankly reflect all sources of ability differences, including individual differences in prior motivation and opportunity to learn. Nonetheless,
direct measures of the student's current functioning level, whatever its multiple
determinants, are important in their own right for a variety of educational purposes. In much instructional planning, for example, it is critical to know what the
student can do now. Some instructional strategies may differ, to be sure, depending on whether current ability levels are thought to reflect deficiencies or difficulties deriving from problems of motivation or of opportunity. In these instances,
and perhaps as a general rule, measures of developed abilities should be interpreted in the context of independent information about motivation and opportunity, the latter being conceived broadly enough to include the quality of prior
and current instruction (Heller, Holtzman, & Messick, 1982; Messick, 1983).
At the level of theory, most modern conceptions of ability development are
basically interactionist in character; that is, they accord a causal role to interaction with the environment and hence are counter to earlier traditions of fixed
intelligence and of genetically predetermined development (Hunt, 1961; Messick, 1972). Although many theorists hold that the primitive or rudimentary
processes that initially interact with the environment are innate, these processes
are not the abilities that develop out of the interaction. Even in those instances
where a basic innate ability is postulated to start the interactive process , such as
Catte ll 's (197 1) fluid intelligence, this ability itself develops as a conseq uence of
environmental interaction while it simultaneously facilitates the formation and
development of specific abilities in response to differentiated environmental
structure.
Many of these theories also stress a centra l role for positive transfer in learning and development. In the theory of ability development elaborated by Ferguson (1954, 1956), for example, abilities are viewed as learned proficiencies that
attain relative stability through overlearning. They develop through repeated
performance across similar tasks and gradually attain relative stability through
exercise, challenge, and practice. Note that the reference is to relative stability ,
not fixity- that is, proficiency has developed to that part of the learning curve
where additional effort yields small though nonzero increments. Learning that
leads to the development of a particular ability, however, is influenced by prior
learnings and previously established abilities through mechanisms of transfer.
Indeed, one should expect that the most critical variables exerting transfer effects
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on subsequent learning would be abilities- that is, those earlier acquisitions that
have attained stability in performance.
The operative transfer function in this regard relates performance on a particular task, or set of simi lar tasks, both to training on those tasks and to proficiency
levels on relevant abilities. If the learning period is sufficiently prolonged that
significant changes in the abilities accumu late as a function of training and
experience, those changes would also be taken into account. Ferguson (1954)
maintains that "as the learning of a particular task continues, the abi lity to
perform it becomes gradually differentiated from, although not necessarily independent of, other abilities which facilitate its differentiation [po 110]." Because
existing abi lities, once developed, thus serve to facilitate the differentiation of
other specific abi lities, the operation of positive transfer produces positive correlations not only among tasks but among abilities . Thus, positive transfer furnishes a simple rationale for the emergence of broader and broader higher-order
abilities organizing the primary abilities. This suggests that individuals not only
develop multiple abilities but organized ability structures as well. It also suggests
that major gains in intellectual power may not come so much from the further
honing of already well-developed specific abilities as from their organization into
more general and widely applicable assemblies of integrated ability complexes.
Furthermore, an important implication of Ferguson's (1954, 1956) line of
argument is that consistent differential exposure to various task domains leads to
differential learning and hence to the emergence of different ability patterns in
different learn ing env ironments or different cultures (Irvine, 1969; Lesser, Fifer,
& C lark, 1965; Stodolsky & Lesser, 1967). One might expect, however, that
higher-order abi lities , if they indeed reflect general transfer components underlying the mutual facilitation of several primary abiliti es, would tend to apply across
a variety of task requirements. Hence, higher-order abilities should appear more
similar from one cultural group to another than do the more specialized primary
abilities (MacArthur, 1968; Vernon, 1969).
Given different learning histories and different learning sty les, it seems likely
that- although the same basic ability processes may be involved in many different tasks- they may be strategically used more or less frequently in different
tasks by different persons. Ability processes may also be organized and deployed
in different ways for performing the same task, with attendant variation in
effectiveness. This has led some investigators , such as Simon (1976) and Snow
(l980b) , to emphasize the assembly and control funct ions of abilities and abi lity
structures.
For Gui lford as for Ferguson, transfer also plays a critical role in abi lity
development. Guilford (1967) claims that' 'the brain is apparently predesigned
to perform in five major ways [po 417]" corresponding to the five informationprocessing operations of cognition or comprehension, memory, convergent production, divergent production, and evaluation that comprise the heart of his
factorial model of the structure of intellect. Specific intellectual abilities develop
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through the repeated use of these five operations to process information in the
individual's environment, which Guilford's extensive empirical investigations
suggest is so structured as to contain 24 types of information generated by the
cross-classification of four types of content (figural, symbolic, semantic, behavioral) and six types of form or product (units , classes , relations , systems, transformations, implications).
In Gui lford 's (1967) view , these specific abilities are generali zed ski lls or
habits that develop through transfer effects occurring by virtue of similarities in
the task-to-task activities of a particular operation-content- product type. How
well any specific ability develops depends on how much and how effectively the
individual exercises the requisite operation in relation to the particular content- product combination. This in turn depends on the opportunities the person's
environment offers to operate on such combinations and the individual's needs to
cope with those offerings . Because tasks within the same operation- contentproduct category are more simi lar in shared activities than those in different
categories, a specific ability should eventually develop via transfer for every cell
of the operation by content by product cross-classification . This would yield the
120 abilities in Guilford's structure of intellect. Moreover, because simi larities in
shared activities may cut across content- product differences for a given operation such as memory or across operation- product differences for a given content
such as figura l, higher-order abilities such as general memory facility or general
figural facility may also emerge (Guilford, 1981 ; Messick , 1973).
Cattell 's ( 1971) theory of ability development is especiall y pertinent to issues
of educational achievement because he explicitly stresses not only the role of
transfer processes in development but the transfer power of developed abi lities in
task performance. Originating in the investment of innate fluid intelligence in the
learning of particular tasks or task domains, specific task ski ll s become integrated into primary abi lities that cut across simi lar or related tasks. That is ,
because of an inherent simi larity in the required activities in a particular domain ,
a unity of functioning develops--or in Cattell's (1971) words , "a coherent set of
habit ski lls, know ledge, conceptual developments, and tactical and strategic
' know how ' [p o 319]," These primary abi lities, which Cattell calls "agencies,"
become organized through the ir mutually facilitative transfer effects and shared
investments of fluid intelligence into higher-order abilities.
Catte ll (197 1) gives major emphas is to those primary ab ilities derived from
the learning of judgmental sk ill s associated with the more abstract parts of school
curricula and nonschool experiences, such as verbal ability and numerical abi lity.
In the course of education and ex perience , these judgmental skill s become organized into a broad higher-order abi lity complex, which Cattell call s crysta lli zed
inte lligence . Other higher-order abi lities include general memory , general visualization, and general retrieva l or fluency. In underscoring the increasing transfer
power of primary abilities and hi gher-order abilities, Cattell (1971) likens a
specific transferable sk ill to a " tool ," by which he means "some insightful
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device in thinking and acting which , once picked up, enables the user to handle a
whole group of further performances [p o 316]." He conceives of an agency or
primary ability as a "whole tool box of cognitively consistent habits [p o 321],"
which would make crystallized intelligence a veritable workshop of transferable
structures of ability processes. For Cattell, crystallized intelligence comprises
highly general abstractions that possess wider transfer effects than those of any of
the agencies and hence displays a broad generality of useful application.
From Cattell's (1971) description of abilities as organized complexes of transferable concepts and skills and from Guilford's (1967) formulation of abilities in
terms of information-processing operations, it seems clear that abilities in this
factor-analytic tradition may be conceptualized as process structures, to use
Carroll's (1974) term, or as stable constellations of psychological processes.
This usage is consistent with information-processing formulations in cognitive
psychology, as exemplified by Snow's (I 980b ) conception of abilities as structures of assembly and control processes as well as performance processes and by
Sternberg'S (1977) treatment of intellective abilities in terms of both structure
and process. On the one hand , Sternberg characterizes abilities as task proficiencies- specifically, as particular constellations of information-processing components that satisfy the requirements of a given task or type of task. On the other
hand, he also views abilities as dimensions of individual differences- spec ificalIy, as generalized constellations of information-processing components that form
stable patterns of individual differences across multiple tasks or types of tasks .
The critical concept bridging these two notions is that abilities are stable
consistencies within individuals (across variations in setting, time, and task) that
reliably differentiate among individuals (Messick , 1982a). The intraindividual
pattern of abilities for a particular student is the ability structure of concern in
educational achievement. This mayor may not include all the ability dimensions,
or interrelate them in the same way, as in interindividual structures of betweenperson differences. Nevertheless, research on the structure of individual differences does provide many of the dimensions and associated ability measures
for characterizing and assessing individual structures (Burt, 1949; Cattell, 1971;
Ekstrom, French, & Harman, 1976, 1979; Guilford , 1967; Hakstian & Cattell ,
1974) .
Moreover, because abilities in this view are constellations of informationprocessing components operative either in a particular task or stably across
multiple tasks , they in turn may serve as components or organizers of still more
complex or temporally extended sequential processes, such as problem solving
or creative production (Guilford, 1967; Messick , 1972, 1973) . Thus, functioning
much like subroutines or prior assemblies in computer terms , abilities not only
facilitate performance on specific tasks and enhance the learning of new tasks but
may also serve as operational modules in higher-order psychological processes.
Overall , then, a person's developed ability structure is conceptuali zed here as a
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multidimensional organization of stable assemblies of information-processing
components that are combined funct ionally in task performance, learning, problem solving, and creative production (Messick , 1972, 1973 , 1982a) .
In educational achievement, abilities and ability structure are engaged with
knowledge structure in the performance of subject-area tasks. Abilities and
knowledge combine in ways guided by and consistent with knowledge structure
to form patterned complexes that may differ by subject area, so that problem
solving in physics, for example, appears different from problem solving in
biology or in political sc ience. Furthermore, as expertise develops these ability- knowledge complexes may become markedly , even qualitatively, different
by area. Thus, abilities are not revealed directly in educational achievtlrnent
testing but rather are entai led in ability- knowledge combinations. Yet they do
operate in achievement conjointly with knowledge, and hence ability tests and
achievement tests will overlap considerably and correlate substantially---except
possibly, as indicated earlier, in low-level achievement testing that primarily
stresses information retrieval and first-order relations. Moreover, because the
engagement of abilities is extensive and complex in high-level achievement, it
would not be surprising to find quite high correlations at advanced achievement
levels. For example, in a Graduate Record Examinations rescaling study, when
19 advanced subject-matter tests were correlated with a combination of verbal
and quantitative abilities, six coefficients were between .71 and .81, whereas
nine were between .60 and .70 (Wallmark , 1969).
Still, cognitive ab ilities are not the same as subject-matter achievement, even
those representing generalized school-related learnings such as crystal lized intel ligence. Indeed, for many educational purposes it is important to assess them
separately . That is, a person may fail in subject-area task performance because of
inadequate knowledge (especially strategic knowledge), dysfunctional knowl edge structure , ineffective mobilization or organization of a complex of relevant
abilities, or deficiencies in anyone of these abilities. Achievement tests tap all of
these in concert and although they may often effectively separate knowledge
retrieval from knowledge use, they do not provide independent assessments of
cognitive abilities . Thus, the coordinate measurement of cognitive abilities as
well as subject-matter achievement may contribute to the comprehensive diagnosis of academic difficulties.
Cognitive abilities are independent of subject matter but they are by no means
content-free; rather, they cut across content areas. In some instances , they may
be specialized by type of content such as verbal , numerical, or figura l, but at
higher orders they represent more general functions such as memory or fluency .
The route taken to arrive at this point may have appeared to be circuitous, but it
was a deliberate attempt to forge an explicit link between concern over the role of
cognitive abilities in achievement testing and 50 years of factor-ana lytic work on
the delineation and measurement of abilities.
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Contrasting Views of Knowledge Versus Ability in
Achievement Testing
This view of educational achievement as a compound of developed ability and
knowledge structures shares some important features with other conceptions of
achievement but also entails some critical differences in substance and emphasis.
As an instance, Ebel (1969, this volume) maintains that' 'the essence of achievement is command of useful verbal knowledge [1969, p . 66]." Ebel (1974, 1982)
makes it clear that he is speaking not merely about amount of knowledge or
information but about knowledge structure-that is, abo ut the "structure of
relationships among concepts, a structure built out of information by processes of
thought [1974 , p. 3171." But he limits this structure specifically to verbal knowledge, whereas the present formulation admits any form of knowledge, whether
verbal or visuospatial or whatever. Ebel (1969, 1982) also stresses the usefulness
of the knowledge, with the implication that useful knowledge is what gets built
into the knowledge structure whereas useless knowledge is soon forgotten. In
contrast, the present formulation stresses the usefulness of the knowledge structure as a functional system in thinking. However, the critical difference between
Ebel's view and the present one is his exp licit exclusion of general cognitive
abi lities except for knowledge-dependent, area-specific ski lls such as addi ng
fractions or formulating sentences (Ebel, 1969, 1974). This is puzzling in light of
Ebel's insistence that achievement is the command of knowledge because, as
Snow (l980a) has underscored, "'command' implies organization, generalization, faci le adaptation and application of knowledge in new contexts; that is
what, I contend, general mental abilities are! [po 43]."
In contrast to Ebel' s exclusion of developed cognitive abi lities from achievement, Anastasi (1976, 1980, this volume) subsumes achievement under the
rubric of developed abilities. She refers to a continuum of tests of developed
abilities that vary in their degree of experiential spec ificity . Included along with
"culture-fair" tests, tests of verbal and nonverbal intelligence, and tests of
differentiated cognitive abilities are course-oriented achievement tests of technical skills and factual knowledge as well as broadly oriented achievement tests of
major long-term educational goals such as the interpretation of literature or the
understanding and application of scientific principles (Anastasi, 1976).
The differentiation among educational and psychological tests in terms of
experiential specificity is a helpful one, and the implication that these tests" fuse
imperceptibly" with one another is an important caveat against misuse. For
example, some tests designed to assess subject-matter achievement so stress the
application of learned skills to the solution of new problems in the area that they
appear to measure general reasoning and other cognitive ab ilities fairly independent of factual content; whereas some other tests designed to assess general
scholastic abi lity draw free ly on varieties of specific word knowledge and arithmetic principles learned in school. However, the subtle implication that because
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ex isting tests overlap markedly or are misa ligned with the ir constructs, there fore
the construct distinctions are unimportant- that " the terms intelligence, aptitudes. abilities. and achievements are indeed different words for essentially the
same human characteristics lEbel, 1980, p. II) "-{!oes not fo llow at all and is
insidious in its impact on new measurement efforts. What is needed is not a
downplaying and blurring of the construct distinctions but , rather, attempts to
illuminate these distinctions in refined measures of knowledge structures, of
cognitive abilities as process structures, and of ability- knowledge complexes in
problem representation and solution .

EXPERTISE AND APTITUDE
It should be noted that the present conception of educational achi evement is not
tied to program or course obj ectives. Educational achievment in thi s view re fers
to what a person knows and can do in a subject area, not just the degree to which
the person knows and can do what was taught. Such a narro wing of purview can
of course be imposed and for some uses of ac hievement tests, such as the
certification of curriculum mastery or the evaluation of program or course effectiveness, probably shou ld be imposed . Even here, however, one should not
automatically preclude the assess ment of generalization and transfer in the former instance or of potential side effects in the latter. The po int is that for other
uses of achievement tests-s uch as the diagnosis of academic strengths and
weaknesses as a basis for remediation or for adaptive instruction and the prediction of future attainment as a basi s for selection , placement , or assignment to
alternative treatments- the broader view may offer added value. Some examples
of thi s added value come from a consideration of the differences between beginning and experienced learners in a fi eld and between novices and experts.

Assessing What Is Learned, Not On ly What Is Taught
As we have seen , when students learn something spec ific, they usually also learn
something general; that is , they tend to educe general attributes from spec ific
instances and evolve general structures for representing and understanding new
spec ifics. For beginning students in a fie ld , these rudimentary knowledge structures tend to be idiosyncratic , because new information is assimi lated to the
student 's intuitions about the subj ect derived from everyday experiences . These
structures or informal theories are also frequently fragmented or overextended or
misaligned with reality . In some instances, these informal theories are simply
vague and poorly articu lated vers ions of acceptable structures, requiring the
progressive differentiation and reintegration of already ex isting ideas with new
know ledge (A usubel, 1968). In other instances, however, the student' s informal
notions may be seriously at variance with form al theories or accepted structures,
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in which case they constitute what Driver has called "alternative frameworks "
(Driver, 1981 , 1982; Driver & Easley, 1978). These alternative frameworks,
being based on student's intuitions , tend to be quite persistently embraced and
are frequently resistant to change through instruction .
A number of common alternative frameworks have been uncovered in science
education in particular. For example, some beginning biology students evince a
persistent tendency to think in Lamarckian terms (Deadman & Kelly , 1978) and
some believe, despite instruction on photosynthesis to the contrary, that plant
"food" comes exclusively from the ground (Driver, 1982). Some beginning
physics students have been found adhering to non-Newtonian ideas about motion
and to notions of impetus reminiscent of pre-Galilean dynamics (Viennot, 1979) .
It appears that intuitions are not readily abandoned and, in particular, that scientific principles that are counter-intuitive are not easily assimilated. If conceptual
learning entai ls such radical restructurings of ideas , it is not enough to assess for
diagnostic purposes whether or not the student knows what was taught--one
must also assess what else the student "knows" or believes about the subject.
A simi lar point holds for the assessment of expert- level achievement but for a
different reason : namely , much of what is learned in the development of expertise, we do not know how to teach . However, from a convergence of recent
studies we have begun to characterize, albeit tentatively , some of the complexities of developed knowledge and ability structures that constitute the power of
expertise (Chi, Feltovitch , & Glaser, 1981; Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979;
Glaser, 1981; Hunter, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980a,
1980b; Rigney, 1980; Simon, 1976). Hence , we may be able to approach the
assessment of expertise in terms of these outcomes of learning and development,
which are beginning to become clear, rather than in terms of the objectives of
teaching, which in the case of expert ise continue to be vague and ill-defined.
It appears from this recent work that not only do experts know more than
novices or have a vastly richer store of relevant knowledge in long-term memory,
they also structure and continually restructure knowledge in more complex ways.
In particular, experts construct comp lex schemas that comb ine some of the
dimensions and simpler schemas used by novices into integrated funct ional patterns, while at the same time discarding as redundant or irrelevant some other
dimensions that novices attend to. Experts also develop new patterns of perceiving, thinking, and acting or what Ian Hunter (\ 982) calls "adroitly usable patterned complexes." These complex abilities to perceive and apply both patterned
relational schemas and the attendant action sequences strongly influence the
nature of problem representations, the avoidance of irrelevancies, and the organization of performance and solution processes . Experts also develop greater speed
and fluency of performance, implying in addition to the restructuring already
mentioned a continual tuning of processes, the automatization of routines and
control processes, and the shedding of redundant processes (Rumelhart & Norman, 1976) . Furthermore, in contrast to novices , experts appear more capable of
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flexible restructuring for the application of multiple perspectives to problem
representation and solution as well as for the adjustment or replacement of
dysfunctional initial schemas as hypotheses change.
In addition to providing possible guidelines for the assessment of expertise,
these findings suggest that not only do abilities facilitate the development of
more complex abilities but so do rich and extensive knowledge structures. Thus,
developed abilities influence the structuring and restructuring of knowledge
whereas developed knowledge structures influence the organization and application of abilities, leading to increasingly more complex structures of each. Although the "adroitly usable patterned complexes" of ability developed by experts are inherently knowledge-dependent, some of their structural and
functional aspects may be generalizable to the learning of other fields. For
example, when an expert in one field attempts to learn a different subject matter,
he or she may be more able than the ordinary novice to discern the deep structure
of the new field, to ignore irrelevancies, and to perceive the patterned relationships entailed in constructing complex schemas, even though a massive store of
knowledge in the fi eld has not yet been acquired. If this is possible, then what we
should mean by a generalist is not a jack-of-all trades and a master of none , but a
jack-of-all-trades and a master of one or, preferably, two. Thus, expertise in one
field may be aptitude for the functional mastery of another.

Aptitudes as Facilitators and Forecasters of
Performance
This brings us to the construct of aptitude which , according to Snow (I 980a) ,
refers to " psychological characteristics that predispose and thus predict differences in later learning under specified instructional conditions [p o 4 1] ."
Again , at the outset I want to make clear that there is no necessary implication of
innateness in this use of the term. This conception comprises two distinct but
closely related notions of aptitude- namely , aptitude as a forecaster of learning
or performance and aptitude as a facilitator of learning or performance (Cronbach
& Snow, 1977) . Although the applied emphasis may be on predictiveness per se,
the scientific emphas is-in such psychoeducational research as the study of
aptitude-treatment interactions-is mainly on illuminating the facilitating processes that underlie the prediction (Snow, 1980a). This may lead not only to
better prediction but to better and more responsible use of the predictive findings .
A compatible conception of aptitude as learning rate is also current (Carroll,
1963; Green, 1974), but again the primary concern is with the process structures
that underlie differences in rate (Carroll, 1974) .
Considerable confusion arises when aptitUde tests as predictors are contrasted
with achievement tests as measures. because achievement in a subject-matter
area happens frequently to be quite predictive of subsequent performance in the
same field. Subject-matter achievement is also often predictive of performance in
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related fi elds, although somewh at less so , whereas measures of general ability
complexes such as tests of schol astic ability or of crystalli zed intelligence tend to
be more widely predictive ac ross disparate fi elds. Furthermore, the distinction
between developed abilities and developed knowledge structures cuts across this
aptitude-achievement contras t, as does Anastasi's (1 976) continuum of experienti al specificity and Snow 's (l 980a) pyramid of referent generality . The latter,
consistent with the present formul ation , illustrates why ability and achi evement
constructs are more readily di stingui shable both conceptu ally and empirically at
more spec ific than more general levels.
Aptitudes may be spec ific or general and so may achievements, developed
abilities, or knowledge structures. Developed abilities and knowledge structures,
being evo lved through education and experience, are both achievements, to be
sure . Yet they are also predictive of subsequent learning and performance, more
broadly in the case of abilities and in more focused fashion in the case of
knowledge structures, thereby qualifying as aptitudes as well. But the predictive
developed ability is not the same as the subsequent performance, nor is it a
measure of that performance . Similarly , current achievement that predicts future
achievement is not a measure o f that later achievement.
T his confusion between prediction and measurement has led some investigators to argue that aptitudes, abilities, and achievements are " essentially the same
human characteri stics [Ebel, 1980 , p. II) " and that aptitude, ability , and
achievement tests are " fundamentall y simil ar" in what they measure (Anastas i,
1980) . The point may be we ll taken in regard to many existing tests. But as
Carroll (1 974) has pointed out , " with a definition of aptitude that identifies it
with the present state of the individual as symptomatic of future performance, it
is difficult to see why there should be any great difficulty in distinguishing
between aptitude and achievement as concepts [p o 287) ." Similarly , in spite of
high corre lations between tests of education al achievement and tests of developed cognitive abilities but in li ght of their differenti al responsiveness to direct
in struction , their differential involvement in aptitude-treatment interactions, their
different courses of development , and differences in their process and content
components, it is difficult to see why there should be any great problem in
di stingui shing between educational achievement and cognitive abilities as
constructs.

TH E FAILINGS OF FALLACIE S
We have been alerted to the jingle fallacy , whereby tests purported to measure
the same construct are naively taken to measure the same thing, and , to the
jangle fall acy , whereby tests purported to measure diffe rent constructs are naive ly taken to meas ure different things (Kelley , 1927) . We now find that if tests
purported to measure different constructs correlate highly with each other, the
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constructs are taken to be the same thing . This might be called the jingle- jangle
fallacy , because convergent correlational evidence , which would support jingles ,
is taken as tantamount to the absence of discriminant experimental evidence,
which would support jangles . However, I prefer to call it the jungle fallacy
because , by failing to maintain the distinction between constructs and their
indicants or measures, we are in danger of reverting to the jungle of operation ism
whereby test meaning resides in each investigator's measurement operations
rather than in validated relational or nomological networks.
What is needed now is what has always been needed- namely , not just the
empirical buttressing of constructs inferred from existing measures but the development and validation of measures attuned to constructs, especially as constructs
evolve or change with conceptualizations of new evidence. In educational theory
and practice today, we must recogn ize, to use Glaser's (1980) words , that "the
study of learning appears to be taking on the characteristics of a developmental
psychology of performance changes- the study of changes that occur as different
knowledge structures and complex cognitive strategies are acquired, and the
study of conditions that affect these transitions in competence [po 322]." Accordingly , in educational measurement today, we must recognize, to use Snow's
(l980a) words, that " achievement constructs refer to complex dynamic cognitive structures [p o 44] ." Hence, to better serve both theory and practice, new
approaches to achievement measurement shou ld be more complex, dynamic , and
cognitive .
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